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COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS AND THE
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
WALTER H. E. JAEGER*
INTRODUCTION
it seems especially appropriate to discuss the rights of third
party labor beneficiaries at this time, since the centennial anniversary
of Lawrence v. Foxy has just occurred.' The same jurisdiction, New
York, where that celebrated case was decided also saw one of the
first third party labor beneficiaries succeed in obtaining judgment
early in this century.' This was to be expected in a case originating
in the modern birthplace of the third party beneficiary.'
Although the purpose of this article is to examine some of the
leading cases which have enforced the collective labor agreement by
the application of the third party beneficiary principle, a brief refer-
ence to other theories of recovery by the employee may prove useful.
* Professor of Law, GeorgetoWn University Law Center. A.B., Columbia Univer-
sity; MS., LL.B., Ph.D., Juris.D., Georgetown University. Editor, Williston, Treatise
on the law of Contracts (3rd Ed. 1957-) ; Cases and Statutes on Labor Law (1939);
Co-Editor (with James Brown Scott), Cases an International Law (1937); Co-Editor
(with William V. O'Brien) Cases on International Law (1958); Author, Law of Con-
tracts (1953).
1 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
2
 For a general discussion of the case Iaw and periodical literature, see Jaeger,
Cases and Statutes on Labor Law (1939, 1959 Supp.), Chapter XI, Collective Labor
Agreements; and Williston, Contracts (3d ed., Jaeger 1959) § 379A.
3
 Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N.Y.S. 952 (3rd Dep't 1914).
4 In Dutton v. Poole, 1 Vent. 319, 2 Jones 102, 2 Lev. 210, 83 Eng. Rep. 156
(1677 KB.), it was held that a contract made between a father and a brother for the
benefit of a third party (the daughter and sister respectively of the contracting parties)
was enforceable. However, in modern times the English courts have expressly rejected
the third party beneficiary concept, Meddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. 393, 121 Eng. Rep.
762 (1861 Q.B.) ; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge [19151 A.C. 847. See also
note 32 infra.
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"CUSTOM," "USAGE," OR "RULE"
The early cases held that the colleCtive labor agreement was not
a contract but merely a collection of customs, usages and rules gov-
erning the general working conditions in a given plant, factory, mine
or other place .
 of employment.5 This has often been, referred to as
the usage theory, and one of the earliest cases adopting it is Hudson
v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. P. R. Co.,° where an engineer was discharged
and brought action on the ground that such was in violation of a
collective labor agreement. The court advanced the theory that the
engineer's rights were based on his individual contract of employment,
the collective agreement being merely a memorandum of the wage
scale 'and of certain regulations incorporated by reference therein.
The court discussed at some length Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co.,'
a case in which it was held that although the employee stated he
understood the rules of the mine as embodied in the collective agree-
ment, such was not tantamount to an incorporation of them by refer-
ence in his employment contract. As a consequence the trial court
excluded evidence of the agreement. The ruling was upheld on appeal,
it being found that the employee had not adopted the collective agree-
ment as part of his indiyidual contract of employment.
In a leading case, Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 8
the Supreme Court of Nebraska comprehensively treated the subject
of employees' rights under collective labor agreements and reviewed
the authorities, considering the case as one of novel impression. When
a reduction in force occurred among employees of the railroad, the
plaintiff had been discharged. Contending that his seniority rights
had been infringed, he brought action. The court in affirming judg-
ment for the employee stated: "When the collective agreement is
published by the managers, it becomes then the rule of that industry." 5
In the more recent case of Associated Flour Haulers & Ware-
housemen, Inc. v. Sullivan,'° it is stated:
"The contract is a typical skeleton contract between em-
ployer and employee, where the details of the work to be
done are purposely omitted, it being implied that the em-
ployee shall perform. such work as would reasonably be
5 Jaeger, supra note 2, at 761-762, 768.
6 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47 (1913) ; plaintiff engineer could not recover judgment,
hiring held to be "at will."
7 180 Mo. 241, 79 S.W. 136 (1904).
8 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934).
° Id. at 501, 253 N.W. at 698, discussing numerous cases applying the "usage"
theory.	 '
10 168 Misc. 315, 318, 5 N.YS.2d 982, 984 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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expected from the nature of the employment or such as
practice and custom have presented. The parties by a course
of conduct over a great period of years have built up such
custom and practice herein which the law will read into the ,
contract."
AGENCY THEORY
There is also a line of cases holding that the union is the agent
of the individual, employee for the purpose of making the contract."
As, might be expected, since Massachusetts, does not subscribe to
the third party, contract doctrine, examples of the agency theory are
found in its jurisprudence notably in Shinsky v. O'Neil," Shinsky v.
Tracey," and Goyette v. Watson Co. 14
 Cases in other jurisdictions
similarly holding include Piercy v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,"
and Shelley v. Portland Tug & Barge" Co." In the latter case, the
court, relying more specifically on Williston" which is quoted, and
distinguishing Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Webb," states:
"That [that] case is distinguishable from the instant
case in many iMportant particulars is obvious. There the
•Brotherhood, in making its contract with the railroad corn-
. pany, had authority to act for its own members. As to them
the relation 'Of 'principal and agent existed. In the instant
case no employee of the defendant was a member of Local
No. 17. Therefore, that organization had no authority to act
.
for defendant's employees and, therefore, plaintiff's right to
• sue the defendant under the contract cannot be sustained
upon the ground of agency, for, as said by Professor Wil-
liston: The right of a third person benefited by a contract tO
sue upOn it has sometimes been defended upon the ground
that the promiiee was the agent of the third person. But the
existence of any agency is a.qUestion of fact. It cannot be
assumed as a convenient piece of machinery when in fact
there was no agency.' "19
11 Jaeger, supra note 2, 'at 763-764, 782.
12 232 Mass. 99, 121 N.E. 790 (1919); cf. Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74
N.E. 603 (1905) ; Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 16, 104 N.E. 717 (1914).
18 226 Mass. 21, 114 N.E. 957 (1917).
14 245 Mass. 577, 140 N.E. 285 (1923). 	
.	 .
18 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923); Mueller 'v. Chicago & 'N.W: Ry. Co.; 194
Minn. 83, 259 N.W. 798 (1935).
16 158 Ore. 377, 382, 76 P.2d 477, 479 (1938); cf. Gary v. Central of Geoigia Ry.
Co., 37 Ga. App. 744, 141 S.E. 819 (1928). 	 '
17 Williston, stipro. ,at' § 111, Consideration Distinguished from Motive. '
79 64 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1933).
19 Williston, supra note 2, at	 352, quoted in Shelley v. Portland TUg & Barge
Co., supra note 16.	 -
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RATIFICATION
The employee has been required to ratify the contract made by
the union in some jurisdictions, as exemplified by West v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. Co.," Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 2 ' and Panhandle &
Santa Fe R. Co. v. Wilson.' In the Burnetta case," ratification was
held essential to the validity of a collective labor agreement, the court
finding that in order to bind the individual members of the union,
they must exercise assent to the terms of the contract. Such assent
will not be implied from the fact that they have knowledge at the
time of the contract. 24
 In another frequently cited opinion," it is
stated:
"And the rule seems to be that individual members of
a labor union are not bound by contracts between the union
and employers, unless such agreements are ratified by the
members of the union as individuals, and that in the absence
of such ratification by a member, no rights accrue to him
which he can enforce against the employer."
Similarly in Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Webb," the court
said: "When, however, the agreement purports to be limited to certain
classes of employees, it has no application to employees of another
class unless it be specially adopted in hiring them."
THE "TRUST" CONCEPT
In addition to the agency theory much more recently it has been
suggested that the individual employee's rights might be well pro-
tected by using a trust concept.27 The union or bargaining represent-
ative could be regarded as holding the employer's promises in trust
for the benefit of the individual employees, the Massachusetts trust 28
being cited as a familiar situation wherein one party administers
20 103 W.Va. 417, 137 S.E. 654, 655 (1927).
21 Supra note 7.
22 55 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) ; cf. Young v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co.,
[19311 A.C. 83.
23 supra note 7.
24 180 Mo. 241, 79 S.W. 136 (1904) discussed in Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific
Ry. Co., supra note 8.
25 West v. B. & 0. R.R. Co., supra note 20 at 422; Jaeger, supra note 2, at 764-765,
733.
21 Supra note 18 at 904.
27 Cox, Rights Under A Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956). Cf.
Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T.J. Kurdle Co., 144 A.2d 88 (Md. Ct. App. 1958).
28 For a suggestion that the Massachusetts business trust might serve as an analogy
for this trust concept, see Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, 8 Lab. L.J. 850 (1957).
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contracts made for the benefit of a large and variable group of
beneficiaries. Under this view, the union would be the party to bring
suit against the employer and would hold any damages recovered in
trust for the aggrieved employee. If the union failed in its trust, the
employee would be obliged to sue the union, a step fraught with
procedural problems, especially in state courts 29 where a union might
not be suable.
In recent times, the collective labor agreement has gradually
been given judicial recognition as a contract, partly, at least, due to
public policy,a° and partly attributable to more skillful draftsmanship.
While the doctrines of custom and usage, agency, ratification, or
trusteeship have been invoked in various courts or embodied in many
statutes to afford the employee a means of recovery under the col-
lective labor agreement, by far the greater number of recoveries have
been held in reliance on the third party contract principles.
29 Jaeger, supra note 2, chapter II, § 5 The Union As a Party To Litigation;
Williston, supra, note 2, § 308A and § 309A, wherein is discussed the original common
law rule which refused to permit a member of an unincorporated labor organization
to bring an action against it. Since all members of the association would have to
be joined to permit such a suit would be tantamount to allowing a person to sue
himself. McClees v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 59
Ohio App. 477, 18 N.E.2d 812 (1938), citing in support Boone v. Century Athletic
Club, 49 Ohio App. 155, 195 N.E. 395 (1934). Nor could the union bring an action
unless all the members were joined therein, O'Jay Spread Co. v. Hicks, 185 Ga. 507,
195 S.E. 564 (1938) ; St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders Union No. 37, 94
Minn. 351, 102 N.W. 725 (1905).
A case which fully espouses the common Iaw point of view is Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Allen, 230 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
934 (1950). The action was for wages alleged to be wrongfully withheld from the
plaintiff resulting from "a conspiracy" between the Texas and New Orleans Railroad
and the Brotherhood. The plea in abatement filed by the Brotherhood was overruled
by the trial court. The Court of Civil Appeals held that plaintiff, being a member of
defendant union, would in effect be suing himself and therefore reversed. The Allen
case was used to sustain a similar ruling in the recent case of Atkinson v. Thompson,
311 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). The court cites a number of cases in support
including the McClees case, supra.
30 McCoy v. St. Joseph Belt Railway Co., 229 Mo. App. 506, 516, 77 S.W.2d 175,
181 (1934); Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., supra note 8; in New York, the
courts early recognized the collective labor agreement as a contract, beginning with Cur-
ran v. Galen, 152 N.Y. 33, 46 N.E. 297 (1897), through Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N.Y. 207,
76 N.E. 5 (1905), and culminating in Schlesinger v. Quinto, 117 Misc. 735, 192 N.Y.
Supp. 564 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N.Y. Supp. 401 (1922); Maisel
v. Sigman, 123 Misc. 714, 205 N.Y. Supp. 807 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Murphy v. Ralph, 165
Misc. 335, 299 N.Y. Supp. 270 (Sup. Ct. 1937); and Rolandez v. Star Liquor Dealers,
257 App. Div. 97, 12 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1st Dep't 1939).
Cf. Weber v. Nasser, 61 Cal. App. 1259, 286 Pac. 1074 (1st Dist. 1930), aff'd, 210
Cal. 607, 292 Pac. 637 (1930); Harper v. Local Union No. 520, 48 S.W. 2d 1033 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932).
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THIRD PARTY LABOR BENEFICIARIES:
•	 AT COMMON LAW
For several decades, the jUdiciary was loathe to enforce collective
labor agreements as such, 31 and in England even today, such an agree-
ment is not recognized as a contract. 32  In addition since third party
beneficiaries are not recognized by the British courts these agreements
are completely unenforceable. Although originally the courts in the
United States were inclined to follow the same view, today the great
majoiitY of American jurisdictions have adopted the third party bene-
ficiary principle and apply it in suits by an employee under collective
labor agreements. To show the extent and breadth of this application,
a few of the leading and more representative cases have been selected
for analysis and discussion.
Almost a half century has' Passed since the decision in Gulla
Barton," one of the earliest cases holding•a collective labor agreement
to be a, binding and enforceable contract, with respect to which the
employee Gulla was a third party beneficiary. He had worked in a
brewery owned by.the defendant Barton 29 weeks during 1911-1912,
and 20 weeks during 1912-1913. He was paid nine dollars a week,
the wage he and his employer had apparently agreed upon. He brought
action in 1914 for an additional nine dollars per week, basing his claim
upon the wage fixed by a collective labor agreement entered into
between his employer and the Malsters' Union, of which he was a
member. Judgment for the defendant upon a nonsuit was reversed
by the Appellate Division" on the ground that the plaintiff was the
intended beneficiary of the' collective laboi. agreement.
In another more, recent New York case, Hudak v. Hornell Indus-
tries," the court rejected the employer's contention that the employees
31 Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R. CON. Webb, supra note 18; Hudson v. Cincin-
nati, N.O. & T. Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47 (1913) ; Associated Flour Haulers
& Warehousemen v. Sullivan, supra note 10.
32 Young v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co., supra note 22; Aris v. Toronto, H. & B.
R. Co. [1933] Ont. R. 142, [1933], 1 Dom. L. Rep. 634. Givry, Legal Effects of Col-
lective Agreements, 21 Modern L. Rev. 501 (1958) to the effect that collective labor
agreements are not enforceable in England as contracts.
83 Supra note 3.
34 164 App. Div. 293; 149 N.Y. Supp. 952 (3d Dep't 1914).
38 304 N.Y. 207, 214, 106•N.E.2d 609 (1952), reversing. 278 App. Div. 888 (4th Dep't
1952); the• New York Court of Appeals cited with , approval Gulla v. Barton, supra
note 3, leaving no doubt that the third party beneficiary rule as applied to employees
—"labor beneficiaries"—is fully recognized as a variant of Lawrence v. Fox, supra note 1,
and Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N:Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918). Inasmuch as the courts
have infrequently indicated which, if either, type of beneficiary an employee is, it may,
perhaps be more accurate and in keeping with the actual facts to describe him as
suggested above as a "labor beneficiary."
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were not proper parties to the collective agreement because of Jack
of contract privity:
"Defendant's final contention that plaintiffs are not
proper parties plaintiff must also fall. Inasmuch as the con-
tract directly affected these individual employees, there ap-
pears to be no good reason why they may not assert their
rights thereunder as third-party beneficiaries."
The change in the attitude of the courts is perhaps best reflected
by the language of the court in McCoy v. St. Joseph Belt R. Co."
"So that, although only a few years ago the courts were
holding that an individual member of a labor union could
not maintain an action for the breach of an agreement be-
tween an employer and the union of which the plaintiff was
a member in respect to wages and other rights fixed in the
contract,87 these rulings have been left in the rear in the
advancement of the law on this general subject, and the
holdings are now that these agreements are primarily for the
individual benefit of the members of the organization, and
that the rights secured by the contracts are the individual
rights of the individual members of the union, and may be
enforced directly by the individual." 38
One of the best known and widely-quoted cases, Yazoo and Missis-
sippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Sideboard," involved an employee of the
railroad who started as a freight brakeman in 1910. Four years later
he was transferred to passenger service and served as porter and
brakeman for 14 years, during which time he was paid only the wages
of a porter, despite his claim for wages as a passenger brakeman.
When the railroad refused to accede to his demands, he brought action
on the collective labor agreement although he was not a union member.
The court granted recovery stating that "the contention that a third
party may recover directly on a contract made especially for his
benefit is not an open question in this state [Mississippi] since Cdnada
v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 101 Miss. 274, 57 So. 913. . . . The reasoning
of these cases is this: First, when the terms of the contract are ex-
80 Supra note 30.
37 Hudson v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Ry. Co., supra note 31; Burnetta v. Marceline
Coal Co., supra note 7; West v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., supra note'20.
88 McCoy v. St. Joseph Belt Railway Co., supra note 30, quoting Piercy v. Louis-
ville & Nashville Railway Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923) ; cf. Blum & Co: v.
Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426,' 155 N.E. 134 (1926); Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault,
157 Tenn. 461, 9 S.W.2d 692 (1928).
89 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931).
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pressly broad enough to include the third party, either by name, as
one of a specified class, or, second, where the third party was evidently
within the intent of the terms so used, such party will be within its
benefits, if, third, the promisee had, in fact, a substantial and articulate
interest in the welfare of the said third party in respect to the subject
of the contract." 4°
In a subsequent case, Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co.," the
plaintiff was a member of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, a
party to a collective labor agreement with the defendant railroad.
After being discharged, allegedly, "without just cause," (a require-
ment of the agreement) Moore brought suit. The judgment for the
railroad was reversed on appeal reliance being had on McGlohn v.
Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Co.," in which the Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that a collective labor agreement was a contract made
for the benefit of employee-union members and was enforceable by
them as third party beneficiaries.
Following the remand of the Moore case, removal was had. The
federal district court, considering itself bound by state law, followed
the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court." The Fifth Circuit
reversed," "declining to follow the Mississippi Supreme Court's ruling
[on the applicable statute of limitations],"" whereupon the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the high court of Mis-
sissippi and of the United States District Court and held the employee
to be a third party beneficiary under the written collective labor
agreement."
40 Jaeger, supra note 2, at 772.
41 180 Miss. 276, 176 So. 593 (1937); Dufour v. Continental Southern Lines, Inc.,
219 Miss. 296, 68 So. 2d 489 (195.3).
42 179 Miss. 396, 401, 174 So. 250, 254 (1937), where "the court held that a con-
tract by a labor union with an employer . . . was: (1) Valid; (2) that a member of the
labor union which made the contract could sue thereon, although he had not, himself,
agreed to work for the employer for any definite time; and (3) could not be discharged
by the employer at will." This holding is in line with the weight of authority and should
be approved.
43 Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 24 F.Supp. 731 (S.D. Miss. 1938)
which follows the same case as decided by the Mississippi Supreme Court, supra note 41.
44 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Moore, 112 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1940).
45 The Court of Appeals held that the action was brought on Moore's oral contract
of employment with the railroad, rather than on the written collective labor agreement,
thereby reversing the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, supra note 41, fol-
lowed in 24 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Miss. 1938), supra note 43.
4e Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 312 U.S. 630 (1941), where the Supreme
Court of the United States said quoting the Mississippi Supreme Court: "The appel-
lant's suit is not on a verbal contract between him and the appellee, but on a written
contract made with the appellee, for appellant's benefit, by the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen . . . ." To the defense that Moore's suit was prematurely brought "because
of his failure to exhaust the administrative remedies granted him by the Railway Labor
Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 48 Stat. 1185, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq," the Court replied
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THE PAST DECADE, 1950-1960
Concentrating on the cases decided during the past decade, one
is immediately impressed by the enormous increase in the decisions
sustaining the employee's right of action on collective labor agree-
ments. In jurisdiction after jurisdiction, the courts have applied the
third party beneficiary principle in enforcing the rights of the indi-
vidual employee. Thus, in MacKay v. Loew's, Inc., 47 the court sug-
gested that the collective labor agreement contained certain rights
enforceable by the union and others which were for the primary
benefit of the employee: "The employee, in addition to having rights
under his individual contract of employment, may sue directly on the
collective bargaining contract as a third party beneficiary to enforce
the provisions in the contract which have been made for his benefit."
The right of an employee to bring an action against his employer
for the breach of a collective labor agreement entered into between
the latter and the employee's union was sustained in Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R. Co. v. Sizemore, 48 wherein the court held that the employer's
failure to maintain proper ventilation as required by the contract was
the cause of the employee's silicosis.
Another typical case is Lammonds v. Aleo Manufacturing Co."
in which the employer's breach of contract was established by arbi-
tration, the court merely being required to award damages to the
employee.
In the District of Columbia, where there had been some doubt
as to whether a third party beneficiary could prevail upon a contract
to which he was not privy, the Court of Appeals answered the question
affirmatively at the turn of the half century, in Marranzano v. Riggs
National Bank of Washington," a case in which an employee of the
Washington Star was recognized as being able to bring an action for
damages for breach of a collective labor agreement made for her
benefit. In passing, it may be noted that suits against unincorporated
unions are permitted in the District of Columbia the latter being
treated as quasi-legal entities, as is demonstrated by the case of Busby
v. Electrical Utility Employees Union."
that this was not such a "dispute" and that Moore did not seek reinstatement, but
was seeking the common law remedy of damages for breach of contract by wrongful
discharge; see Williston, supra note 2, § 379A, note 7, at 993.
47 182 F.2d 170, 172 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).
49 258 Ala. 344, 62 So. 2d 459 (1953).
49 243 N.C. 749, 92 S.E.2d 143 (1956).
60 184 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; cf. United States Daily Publishing Corp. v.
Nichols, 59 App. D.C. 34, 32 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1929), where the court followed the
"usage" or "custom" theory in giving the employees a right of action.
61 79 App. D.C. 336, 147 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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In Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co.," decided by
the Court of Appeals of the neighboring jurisdiction Maryland, an
extensive discussion is had of the various means employed to enforce
employee's rights under a collective labor agreement. The case in-
volved an action for damages for wrongful discharge brought by an
employee who based her rights on a collective labor agreement be-
tween her employer and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America, Local No. 149, a union of which she
was a member. Citing the Marranzano case, the court held the great
weight of authority sustained the individual employee's right of action
on a collective labor agreement.53
The California Courts have been liberal in enforcing employee
rights. In Leahy v. Smith," the court states:
"The sole question presented by this appeal by the plaintiff
from the judgment of nonsuit is whether the plaintiff, a
non-union employee of defendant, is entitled to rights as
third-party beneficiary under two collective bargaining
agreements entered into between the Union and the defend-
ant employer. Plaintiff does not claim to be a union member
and holds only a 'work permit' card issued by the Union.
"The right of a union member to recover as a third-
party beneficiary under such an agreement has been rec-
ognized in California. 55 But whether a non-union em-
ployee is such an intended beneficiary has not yet been
decided."
Relying on Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Sideboard,'
supra, Gregg v. Starks," and Coyle v. Erie R. Co.," inter alia, the
Superior Court quoted from a former opinion to the effect that "a
non-union member may recover" under the circumstances stated in
the discussion of the Sideboard case, supra," to wit; when such em-
ployee is an intended beneficiary. The appellate court, reversing the
52 144 A.2d 88 (Md. Ct. App. 1958), supra note•27.
53 The court cites and discusses various articles dealing with collective labor
agreements, especially Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 nary. L. Rev. 601
(1956):
54 . 137 Cal.App. 2d 884, 885, 290 P.2d 679, 680 (Sup. Ct. App. Dep't 1955).
55 Here, the court cites Sublett v. Henry's Turk & Taylor Lunch, 21 Cal. 2d 273,
131 P.2d 369 (1942) ; Department of Industrial Relations v. Dennis, 81 Cal.App. 2d
306, 183 P.2d 932 (4th Dist. 1947) ; MacKay v. Loew's Inc., supra note 47.
58 Supra note 39.
57 188 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459 (1920). .
68 142 N.J.Eq. 306, 59 A.2d 817, (1948) rev'd on other grounds, I N.J. 350, 63
A.2d 702 (1949).
58 Supra note 39.
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judgment of the Municipal Court of the Los 'Angeles. Judicial District;
decided in favor of the non-union employee's right to maintain the
action as a third party beneficiaiy."'o
. Presenting facts of a somewhat Unusual nature, the decisiOn in
Bendne v. International Harvester Company' lends emphasis to the
breadth the third party beneficiary doctrine has achieved in the more
recent cases. It also arose in California the questiOn being whether
there may be a waiver under a collective bargaining agreement of an
employee's statutory right to pay while voting in a 'political election. 62
When an employer dedUcted two hOurs' wages because 59 of his
employees absented themselves during working hours on "a General
Election. Day," the employe6 brought suit for the pay which had
been deducted. The employei alleged that "By the plain terins of
the collective bargaining contract, the appellants waived 'their right
to compensation while taking time off to. vote." However, in reversing
the trial court, this "waiver" was held invalid since the pay-while-
voting statute was considered a right "created in the public interest
[which] may not be contravened by private agreement."" There was
no question but that the employees were third party beneficiaries. • 
Holding that there was a common law tyight of action against an
employer under a collective labor agreement, but none against the
union of which the employer was a member,TM a Texas court concluded
that under the doctrine of Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co.,7 there
was no necessity that the employee "must first exhaust his adminis-
trative remedy . . . The Supreme Court [of the United "States] held
that he need not do so, but he could treat the discharge as final and
sue for damages for wrongful discharge,"" at common law. '
Applying the law of Alabama, the Court of Appeals 'for the
Fifth Circuit," after analyzing the effect of the decisions in Westing-
house" and Lincoln Mills," decided that two employees who com-
60 Supra note 54.	 •
61 142 Cal.App. 2d 874, 879, 299 P.2d 750, 753 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1956).
	 '
62 § 56992
 California Election Code ; similar provisions have been held • constitu-
tional, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
65
 De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 67 Cal App. 2d 225, •229; 153 P.2d 983,
986 (2d Dist. 1944), applying § 2855 of the California Labor Code.
64 Atkinson v. Thompson, 311 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
06 Supra note 46.
06 Atkinson v. Thompion, supra note 64, quoting the Moore case, supiatnoie 46,
and citing and discussing Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. McCombs, -143 Tex. 257,
183 S.W.2d 716 (1944), which follows Moore.
67
 Woodward Iron Company v. Ware, 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1958). ".
68 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric 'Corp.,
348 U.S. 437 (1955)'. 	 •
Bs Tiatile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 'U.S.' 448
(1957).
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plained of wrongful discharge were entitled to maintain their action
as third party beneficiaries, citing I. I. Case Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board° in support. An affirmance was had of the judgment
for damages for wrongful discharge." In the course of its opinion,
and relying on the Sizemore case" as declaratory of the applicable
Alabama law, the court states: "Contrary to appellant's contention,
there is not much doubt as to the standing of an individual employee
to sue his employer on a collective contract.73 Most cases rest their
holding on the principle that a collective bargaining agreement is a
contract for the benefit of a third person."'"
Even in Massachusetts, where the third party beneficiary prin-
ciple has not been viewed with favor, 75 individual employees have been
permitted to bring their actions on collective labor agreements made
for their benefit. 7° In Karcz v. Luther Manufacturing Co.," two
employees complained that their employment had been improperly
terminated, and that they were wrongfully deprived of their right to
"retirement separation pay." Without questioning their right to bring
the action, the court proceeded to an analysis of the provision of the
collective labor agreement which reads:
"Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to give any em-
ployee the right to be retained in the service of the employing
mill or to interfere with the right of the mill to discharge
any according to the provisions of this Agreement."
70 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
71 The Court held that wrongful discharge concerned a distinctly personal right
as distinguished from a union right.
72 Supra note 48.
73 In addition to the Sizemore case, the court cited Augustus v. Republic Steel
Corp., 200 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1952), and in a footnote, stated: "The cases are collected
in Annotation, 18 A.L.R.2d 312 (1951)." Various law review articles or notes are also
cited.
74 Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, supra note 67, at 140-41: The Court then quotes
J.I. Case, supra note 70, to the effect that "an employee becomes entitled by virtue
of the Labor Relations Act somewhat as a third party beneficiary to all benefits of
the collective agreement . . . ."
75 Mellen v. Whipple, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317 (1854) ; Exchange Bank v. Rice,
107 Mass. 37 (1871); Terry v. Brightman, 132 Mass. 318 (1882); Borden v. Boardman,
157 Mass. 410, 32 N.E. 469 (1892) ; Bianconi v. Crowley, 256 Mass. 187, 152 N.E.
305 (1926); Pike v. Anglo South American Trust Co., 267 Mass. 130, 166 N.E. 553
(1929).
76 Askinas v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 330 Mass, 103, 111 N.E.2d 740 (1953);
Leonard v. Eastern Massachusetts Street Ry. Co., 335 Mass. 308, 140 N.E.2d 187
(1957); Simons v. American Dry Ginger Ale Co., Inc., 335 Mass. 521, 140 N.E.2d
649 (1957).
77 338 Mass. 313, 315, 155 N.E.2d 441, 443 (1959), discussing McCarron v. Los
Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958), Lincoln Mills, supra note 69, and citing Woodward Iron
Co. v. Ware, supra note 67.
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The employer's "management decided to liquidate the defendant
{Company, the employer] 'because . . . imports had made it impos-
sible to compete and operate at a profit' and gave notice of its intention
on May 8, 1956."78
 Thereafter the Company ceased operations and
the work of its employees terminated. The court held this was not a
breach of contract and affirmed the lower court's decision for defend-
ant Company.
In a case with somewhat similar facts, Hudson County Newspaper
Guild v. Jersey Publishing Co.,79 it was held that closing of business
by the employer was not a breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and consequently the employee had no right to two weeks' notice
in addition to severance pay.
Attempts to classify "labor" beneficiaries as donee or creditor
have been infrequent; yet, because union members employed by the
Olga Coal Company paid dues to the union, they were "creditor bene-
ficiaries" with rights which the equity court would enforce, Pettus v.
Olga Coal Company.8°
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has also recently held" that
employees may bring an action for overtime pay as direct beneficiaries
of a contract made between the United States government and their
employer, in which was stipulated their rate of pay. The court said:
"We have repeatedly held that a contract made for the benefit of a
third party is actionable by such third party. . . ." We adhere to the
above statement. The plaintiffs were not mere 'incidental benefi-
ciaries,'" but were 'direct beneficiaries,'" and are entitled to proceed
under the American majority rule .. . . 85 Thus, the plaintiffs come
within the holdings which allow third party beneficiaries to invoke
the contract."" In light of this holding, the opinion in Roberts v.
Thompson" rendered by the United States District Court in Arkansas
78 Karcz v. Luther Mfg. Co., supra note 77, at 443.
79 23 N.J. Super. 419, 93 A.2d 183 (1952).
80 137 W.Va. 492, 72 S.E.2d 881 (1952).
81 H.B. Deal & Co. v. Marlin, 209 Ark. 967, 971, 193 S.W.2d 315, 318 (1946), quoted
in H.B. Deal & Co., Inc. v. Head, 221 Ark. 47, 251 S.W.2d 1017 (1952).
82 Jaeger, Law of Contracts, 350-351 (1953).
83 The Court in the Head case, supra note 81, states: "The rule as to incidental
beneficiaries is stated in 12 Am. Jur. 834. A case involving incidental beneficiaries is
German Alliance Co. v. Home Water Co., 226 U.S. 220."
84 "The rule as to direct beneficiaries is stated in 12 Am. Jur. 833, and see also
Annotations in 81 A.L.R. 1271 and 148 A.L.R. 359." H.B. Deal & Co., Inc. v. Head,
supra note 81.
85 The court quotes 12 Am.Jur.	 277.
88 H.B. Deal & Co., Inc. v. Marlin, 209 Ark. 967, 968, 193 S.W.2d 315, 317 (1946).
87 107 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Ark. 1952), citing Petty v. Missouri & Arkansas Ry. Co.,
205 Ark. 990, 167 S.W.2d 895 (1943), St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co.
v. Matthews, 64 Ark. 398, 42 S.W. 902 (1897).
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seems all the'more astonishing purporting as it does to follow Arkansas
law. It was there held that an. employee discharged in violation of . a
collective bargaining agreement could not maintain an action for
damages because of the "unilateral" nature of the contract. described
as "lacking in mutuality, since. the employee does not bind himself
to work for any specified period of time and is at liberty to cease
work at will." In addition to being contrary to the Arkansas cases,
it is in conflict with the great weight of authority, and represents a
retrograde tendency not in keeping with the times.
As the Supreme Court of the United States recently said: "The
employees have always been able to enforce their individual rights
in the state courts. They have not been hampered by the rules
governing unincorporated associations. To this extent, the collective
bargaining contract has always been 'enforceable.' "88 Nevertheless
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit cited the Roberts case in
Smithey v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co." and held that "no
right to recover damages for wrongful discharge is recognized in favor
of any employee . . ." These decisions may possibly be explained
on the narrow ground that they dealt only with discharges of em-
ployees under the Railway Labor Act.
Williston, in the latest edition of his authoritative treatise on the
law•of contracts, observes:
"A gradual development in the field of third-party
agreements has been the enforcement of collective bargain-
ing agreements between labor organizations and employers
by the individual employees. While these employees are not
parties to the agreement, they are being recognized as third
party beneficiaries in an ever increasing number of juris-
dictions, even in the absence of statutes.""
UNDER THE STATUTES .
The further consideration of the status of the third party labor
beneficiary will be had under the following captions: the status of
the collective labor agreement and of the third party beneficiary;
conditions precedent to third party's right to bring action including
internal union procedure and administrative remedies; and the effect
of Lewis v. Benedict Gild Corporation."
88 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
supra note 68.
89 237 F.2d 637, 638 (1956); it was further held that there was "a lack of
mutuality." Cf. Williston, op. cit. supra note 2, § 379A. Collective Labor Agreements.
00 Williston, supra note 2, § 379A.
01 80 S.Ct. 489 (1960).	 ' .
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STATUS OF COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS AND
THE THIRD PARTY
While the earlier cases demonstrated a marked reluctance to view
the collective labor agreement as a contract, 92 there is no room for
doubt (and the point is now rarely raised) that under the existing
statutes,, these agreements are contracts. In fact, they are contracts
and something more well describable as "contracts affected with a
public interest." As interpreted by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in the Westinghouse case," the opinion of the Supreme Court
in J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board," seemed to de-
note a slight recrudescence of the early reluctance of recognition of
contract status for labor agreements by its reference to the collective
agreement as a "trade agreement." But eleven years later, in the
Westinghouse case," the Supreme Court rejected the interpretation of
the Court of Appeals, and indicated the collective labor agreement
was a contract giving rights to both the union and the individual
employee. In a footnote," the court referred expressly to the third
party beneficiary doctrine as a means whereby individual employee
rights may be enforced in state courts and cited the following cases
discussed or noted by Professor Williston: 97 Gulla v. Barton," H.
Blum & Co. v. Landau," Mastell v. Salo,'" McGregor v. Louisville
& N. R. Co.,'" O'Day Spread Co. v. Hicks,'" Rentschler v. Missouri
Pac. R. Co.,'" Volquardsen v. Southern Amusement Co.,104 Y azoo &
M. V. R. Co. v. Sideboard,'" Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault,'"
Hall v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co.,' Moore v. Illinois _Central
R. Co.,'" I. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.'"
The Court then continued: "And such suits are still being enter-
92 Jaeger, sUpra note 2, at 761-762, 768.
93 SUpra note 68.
94 Supra note 70.
98 Supra note 68.
99 Supra notes 29 and 68.
01 Williston, supra note 2,	 379A.
99 Supra note 3.
99 Supra note 38.
100 140 Ark. 408, 215 S.W. 583 (1919).
101 244 Ky. 696, 51 S.W.2d 953 (1932).
102 Supra note 29.
103 Supra note 8.
104 156 So. 678 (La. Ct. App. 1934).
108 Supra note 39.
199 Supra note 38.
107 224 Mo.App. 431, 28 S.W.2d 687 (1930).
199 Supra note 46.
109 Supra note 70.
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tained.", 11° and proceeded to add to the list Dufour v. Continental
Southern Lines, Donahoo v. Thompson, 112 Marranzano v.
Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C.,113
 MacKay v. Loew's
Inc."4
In J. I. Case Company, supra, the United States Supreme Court
had occasion to examine and determine the relationship between indi-
vidual contracts of employment and collective labor agreements.
Holding that the individual contract, when in conflict with the col-
lective labor agreement "must yield or the Act' would be reduced to
a futility," the court said that the employee "becomes entitled by
virtue of the Labor Relations Act"" somewhat as a third party bene-
ficiary' to all benefits of the collective trade agreement."' This
approach was followed by the courts until they were confronted with
the question: How are the individual rights of the employees to be
enforced?
The Supreme Court of the United States answered that question
to some extent in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 119 by holding that the individual
or "uniquely personal" rights of the employees under a collective
labor agreement would not be enforced by the federal courts under
§ 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act."' This, of course,
leaves unresolved the meaning of "uniquely personal" or even
"personal" rights, a problem which may give rise to considerable
further litigation, when taken in conjunction with Textile Workers
Union of America v. Lincoln Mills. 12' As Williston says:
"The Westinghouse and Lincoln Mills cases have left
the federal courts somewhat baffled; some intriguing ques-
tions have presented themselves: What are 'personal'
(described in a concurring opinion in the Westinghouse
case as 'uniquely personal') rights of an employee, as dis-
tinguished from union rights? What is the theory of enforce-
ment of individual rights by an aggrieved employee? Is he
110 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., supra note 68, at 500, citing in support Williston, supra note 2, § 379A.
111 Supra note 41.
112 270 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
118 Supra note 50.
114 Supra note 47.
115 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1958).
1 " ibid.
117 Emphasis supplied.
118 j.I. Case Company v. NLRB, supra note 70, at 336.
119 Supra note 68.
120 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958).
121 Supra note 69.
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a third party beneficiary, or are the terms of the collective
labor agreement embodied in the terms of his employment
contract? What is the result if the state does not recognize
third party beneficiaries?"
And in the language of a United States District Court: 122
"Federal courts, labor lawyers and legal scholars alike
have been confounded in their attempts to distill from the
Westinghouse case the precise holding in that case."
Of course, it is clear that certain of these rights are bound to be
strictly personal, whereas others will be held to benefit the union only.
But there is apt to be a penumbra, a twilight zone where the nature
of these rights will be in doubt and recourse will be had to the courts.
And under the most recent labor legislation, The Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959," this twilight zone and the
opportunity for litigation may be greatly enlarged.
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THIRD PARTY'S RIGHT OF ACTION
Assuming that the employee is in a jurisdiction which recognizes
his rights as a third party beneficiary under a collective labor agree-
ment, there is a collateral question: Must the employee exhaust union
grievance procedures and administrative remedies before having access
to the courts? In short, is this a condition precedent?
Grievance Procedures. By the great weight of authority, as exem-
plified by numerous decisions,' a union member is required to follow
the grievance procedures constituting a part of his contract (the union
charter and by-laws) with the union. 125 This requirement closely re-
sembles the "self-denying" attitude of the courts when the dispute is
between the individual member and his union."° But, under certain
circumstances, an aggrieved employee will not be denied access to the
courts even in such cases. This is well illustrated by International
Association of Machinists v. Gonzales127 and Russell v. United Auto
122 Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 78 v. General Electric Co., 170 F.Supp. 945, 948
(E.D. Wis. 1958).
123 Also described as the Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
124 Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., supra note 8, contains a compre-
hensive review of the earlier cases cited in notes 38, 39, 41, 42, 86, 100, 101, 104,
112; also, Jaeger, supra note 2, Ch. XI. For the recent cases, see Williston, supra
note 2, § 379A, especially notes 4 et seq.
125 See Jaeger, supra note 2, at Ch. II, § 4, for a discussion of the contractual
character of the constitution and by-laws of the union as constituting binding obli-
gations upon the union members. See also Williston, supra note 2, at §§ 308A, 309A.
126 McClees v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, supra
note 29.
127 356 U.S. 617 (1957).
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Workers. 128
 Thus, where there is a lack of due process in the grievance
procedure, or there is fraud or collusion, and finally where the union
arbitrarily and unreasonably fails to present his grievance, the member
may bring an action against the offending union. In this connection,
federal and state courts have said that "as a general rule grievance
procedures provided by a collective bargaining agreement should be
a bar to suits by individuals against the Employer based upon alleged
violations of the agreement, but that such suits are not barred if the
Union acted unfairly towards the employee in refusing to press the
employee's claim through to, and including, arbitration under . the
collective bargaining agreement.'""
But it has also been held that a "grievance" does not include a
total breach of contract as in the case of the wrongful dismissal of
an employee: "The grievance referred to in the contract does not
apply so as to prevent an employee from suing to recover damages
for which the defendant is liable to him by reason of a breach of the
contract for his direct benefit. There is no obligation on the part of
the plaintiff to bring a grievance on account of a breach of the contract,
which is complete, resulting in damage to the plaintiff."'"
The further question arises as to whether, in addition to his action
at law on the contract made for his benefit, the employee may bring
a suit in equity to enjoin his dismissal or to compel action by the
employer, the union, or both to protect rights granted him. by the
collective labor agreement. It has, of course, been decided that the
union may compel arbitration where the labor agreement has a com-
pulsory arbitration provision "with respect to arbitration of griev-
ances even where those grievances involve the personal rights of the
employees." 13' This has been held to involve union rights, "and not
128 356 U.S. 634 (1957).
129 Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers of America, 171 F.Supp. 782, 791 (D. Md.
1957).
In Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Sizemore,,supra nate 48.
121 Independent Circulation Union v. Item Co., 163 F.Supp. 399 (ED. La. 1958).
However, there appears to be a split of authority as to whether the federal courts
may enforce arbitral awards based on the individual rights of employees. In A.L.
Kornman Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 264 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1959) the
court held affirmatively, as did Textile Workers Union v. Cone Mills Corp., 268 F.2d
920 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 80 S.Ct. 157 (1959). In the Kornman case, the
court said: "The company contends that this means of enforcement [suit by the union]
is prohibited by the Westinghouse case, supra (note 68), and that the sole means of
redress is for each employee to institute a separate action in a state court for his, or
her, portion of the award. (presumably on the principle of a third party beneficiary).
"We are not in accord with that argument. If the United States District Courts
have jurisdiction and may order compliance with the grievance arbitration provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement, they must necessarily have jurisdiction to enforce
the resulting awards. . . ." 264 F.2d at 737 (parenthetical material added).
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uniquely personal rights of employees sought to be enforced by a
union.' But the further question remains as to what rights the
individual employee has if the union declines to espouse his grievance
and neither seeks to enforce internal union-management grievance
procedures, nor compulsory arbitration provisions of the collective
labor agreement. , The courts are not in accord as to the employee's
rights when he reaches such an impasse. ''
In one significant case, Mello v. Local 4408, CIO United Steel-
workers,133 an employee complained of his discharge after being
accused of bookmaking on the employer's premises. He alleged that
the accusations were untrue and that he had been improperly dis-
charged. He further alleged that he had urged the company and the
union to afford him the requisite grievance procedure, but they had
refused. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island denied him equitable
relief since he was not a party to the contract and would merely
"benefit if the arbitration provided for therein [the agreement] was
held and resulted successfully." 134
In a more recent case, Parker v. Borock,'" the New York Court
of Appeals sustained a judgment of the Appellate Division granting
defendant's motion for summary judgMent in an employee'gvaction
for wrongful discharge, his union, the International Association of
Machinists, having refused to invoke the arbitration machinery pro-
vided for in the collective bargaining agreement. The court said:
"We conclude that the employee is the direct beneficiary of such
provisions [of the collective labor agreement] ... 718 'and held that
the arbitration provision inured solely to the benefit of the union. If
the union arbitrarily and unreasonably refused to invoke the grievance
procedure, the employee's action would have to be brought against
the union.'"
Cf. Item Company v. New Orleans Newspaper Guild, 256 F,2d 855 (5th Cir. 1958)
and Refinery Employees' Union v. Continental Oil Co., 160 F. Supp 723 (W.D. La.
1958) where the courts discuss at some length the effect of the Westinghouse and
Lincoln Mills cases on collective labor agreements, the rights of the parties thereto,
and of the individual employees affected thereby.
182 Textile Workers Union of America +.7. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, supra note 69.
las 82 R.I. 60, 105 A.2d 806, 809 (1954).
734 Under the new legislation, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, supra note 123, Title I, the result might have been different.
182 5 N.Y,2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297 (1959).
1- 313 Here the court cites Gulla v. Barton, supra note 3, and Rotnofsky' v. Capitol
Distrs. Corp., 262 App. Div. 521, 20 N.Y.S.d '563 (1st Dep't 1951).
187 Donato v. American Locomotive Corp., 283 App. Div. 410, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709
(3d Dep't 1954), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E.2d 227 (1954), quoted in the principal
case (Parker v. Borock), supra note 135, where the court also said: "There has. been
a growing recognition by the courts that the collective agreement can modify the terms
of the contract of hiring. (See Williston, Contracts, Section 39A (3d ed.), and Section
379A (Rev. ed.) . . l• '
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However, in Fagliarone v. Consolidated Film Industries, Inc.,'
the converse was held essentially on the ground that the collective
labor agreement gave the employee the right to have a grievance
arbitrated if the employee felt "that he or she has been unjustly
discriminated against . . . ."
Administrative Remedies. Aside from the requirement that mem-
bers must exhaust their union grievance procedures, there is a further
question as to whether the individual employees must exhaust avail-
able administrative remedies. In Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 129
the United States Supreme Court held that whether an employee
must first have recourse to administrative remedies in case of contract
breach involving an allegedly wrongful discharge is a question to be
decided on the basis of the law of the state where the remedy is sought.
As the Mississippi Supreme Court had previously answered this ques-
tion in the negative, such became the law of the case. As a third
party beneficiary, the plaintiff was held entitled to bring his action
on the collective labor agreement. The Mississippi courts have con-
tinued to uphold this right on the basis "that the court remedy is
concurrent with the contractual remedy. 7140
Since Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co.,141 two other cases of
considerable moment have been decided: Slocum v. Delaware, L. &
W. R. Co.,"2 and Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal.143
In the Slocum case, the Supreme Court continued to distinguish be-
tween the employee's common law action and any administrative
remedy which in this case the National Railroad Adjustment Board
might afford, saying:
"Our holding here is not inconsistent with our holding
in Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co. 144
 Moore was discharged
by the railroad. He could have challenged the validity of
his discharge before the [arbitration] Board, seeking re-
instatement and back pay. Instead he chose to accept the
railroad's action in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing
to be an employee, and brought suit claiming damages for
breach of contract. As we there held, the Railway Labor
Act does not bar courts from adjudicating such cases. A
138 20 N.J.Misc. 193, 26 A.2d 425 (Cir. Ct. 1942).
130 Supra note 46.
140 Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T.J. Kurdle Co., supra note 27, citing Moore v.
Illinois Central R.R. Co., 180 Miss. 276, 176 So. 593 (1937).
141 Supra note 46.
142 339 U.S. 239 (1950).
148 345 U.S. 653 (1953).
244 Supra note 46.
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common-law or statutory action for wrongful discharge dif-
fers from any remedy which the Board has power to provide,
and does not involve questions of future relations between
the railroad and its other employees."'"
The foregoing demonstrates that unless the state law makes
recourse to the appropriate administrative body compulsory, as in
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, supra, the ex-
employee may, upon discharge, elect to use his common law remedy
and sue on the collective labor agreement as a third party beneficiary.
In the Kappa/ case, decided under Missouri law requiring recourse
to the administrative remedy, the United States Supreme Court em-
phasized the existence of this common law right, but held that the
plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies since he
did not appeal from hearing officer's decision and "did not allege any
arbitrary action by the hearing officer."'"
Representative of the state court decided cases is Stroman v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.' Here, the plaintiff claimed
she had been wrongfully discharged in violation of her seniority rights
and in contravention of the provisions of the collective labor agree-
ment under which she was working. She was granted summary judg-
ment by the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco
despite her failure "to exhaust her administrative remedies provided
in the Collective Bargaining Agreement." On appeal, after discussion
of Transcontinental & Western Air v. Koppal, supra, the court said:
"The California law requires an employee to exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies under his employment contract before he may bring
an action for damages for violation of such contract." 148
 While con-
cededly the plaintiff had only appealed to the General Manager al-
though the employee's Vice President was the highest officer designated
to hear such complaints, the court found that the plaintiff's superiors
having informed her that the General Manager was the company's
highest officer to receive complaints, the company was "estopped from
urging this defense. Underlying the proper interpretation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement are certain fundamental principles
145 Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R. Co., supra note 142, at 244, quoted with
approval in Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, supra note 67.
146 Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, supra note 143, discussed in
Atkinson v. Thompson, supra note 29.
141
 161 Cal.App. 2d 151, 326 P.2d 155 (1st Dist. 1958).
148 Id. at 164, citing Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal,App. 2d 558, 277 P.2d 464
(2d Dist. 1954) ; Ilagin v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 152 Cal.App. 2d 93, 312 P.2d 356
(1st Dist. 1957) ; Williams v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 147 Cal.App. 2d 1, 304 P.2d 715
(2d Dist. 1956).
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of morality and fair play. While the company was under no duty to
speak, when it did speak through its responsible agents, it was under
a duty to speak the truth, and not to mislead the plaintiff to her
damage.'" This being "another- factual issue that should have been
submitted to the jury" the appellate court reversed the judgment," °
emphasizing that:
"The United States Supreme Court has ruled that under
this statute an appeal to the Adjustment Board is not a con-
.	 dition precedent. to filing a court action." 16 x
While there is nothing in recent labor legislation which affecti
the administrative jurisdiction of. the Railway Adjustment Board or
similaradministrative bodies, such legislation has had a considerable
impact upon grievance procedures, whether embodied in collective
labor agreemenis' or contained in union membership contracts.
EFFECT OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT
Under Title I—Bill Of Rights Of Members of Labor Organizations
of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 1" the -union member "may be required
to' exhaust reasonable, hearing procedures, (but not to exceed a four-
month lapse of time) within such"organization, before instituting legal
or administrative proceedings against such [labor] organizations or
any officer -thereof: . . .", The same Section 101 gives the individual
member a right of action against a labor organization or its officers:
Section 102' gives a similar right to "Any person whose rights .. .
have been infringed by any ,violation of - this title" to bring a civil
action:in . a United States . District Court.. "Any person" would thus
assure a non-union employee the fl rights of a third party beneficiary
under a collective labor agreement made for his benefit. Not being
a member of the • union, its grievance- procedure should not apply to
him, especially since a proviso in Section 101 (A) (4) is limited to "any
such member [who] may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing
procedures.'"" It ,does not use the term "any person."
In passing, it•may, be noted that the Act requires a copy of "each
collective bargaining agreement" be furnished upon request of any
140 Supra note 148. •
1" The court stated that if the jury , found that the alleged representations . were
not made, then "the company is not estopped," and "defendant would be. entitled , to
a summary judgment."
• 151 Citing in support Moore 'v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., supra note 46, and
Transcontinental &. Western Air v. Koppal, supra note 143. 	 ,
152 Supra note 123.	 • •
158 Id. § 101.
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employee "whose rights as such employee are directly affected by such
agreement." The distinction in the use of the terms "employee" and
"member" is further emphasized in the same Section 104 in connection
with the obligation to furnish similar copies "to each constituent unit
(e.g., local unions) which has members directly affected by such
agreement."'" (Italics and parenthetical material added.)
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation
In the most recent case dealing with collective labor agreements,
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation, 156
 the United States . Supreme
Court examined the nature of the collective .bargaining agreement
and the rights of third parties. Before the court was the National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 which provided, inter alia,
for a union Welfare fund meeting the requirements of § 302(c) (5) of
the Labor-Management Relations Act. Under the agreement, various
signatory coal operators undertook to pay into the United Mine
. 
Work-
ers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950, thirty cents
(later increased to forty cents) per ton of coal produced.
Coal produced by the defendant operator resulted in a royalty
of $177,762.92 of which he paid all but $76,504.21 into the Fund.
The latter sum he withheld contending that strikes and work stoppages
entitled him. to do so. This was contested by the union and trustees
of the Fund as third party beneficiaries. In the trial court, Benedict's
right to a set-off against the union was upheld. Judgment was also
given in favor of the trustees' execution being stayed until Benedict's
judgment should be satisfied. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed, except as to the amount of the set-off which was
deemed to be excessive. Certiorari was granted to the Supreme
Court.'"
So much of the holdings below relating to .the determination that
the union had violated the collective bargaining agreement was af-
firmed.'" However, the operator's right to withhold, because of these
violations, any part of the amounts payable into the Fund was denied,
the court determining "that the union's performance of its promises
is not a condition precedent to Benedict's duty to pay royalty" the
operator's obligation being an independent covenant. In this connec-
tion the court observed,
154
 Id.	 104.
155 SO S. Ct. 489, 4 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1960).
156
 As the federal court is bound to apply the local law in diversity cases, Ten-
nessee law as expounded in Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, supra note 38, recognizing
the rights of third party beneficiaries, would govern.
157 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1959).
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"a third-party beneficiary has made no promises and there-
for has breached no duty to the promisor. Accordingly to
hold, as the lower courts in this case did, that a promisor
may 'set off' the damages caused by the promisee's breach
is actually to read the contract, which is the measure of the
third party's rights, as so providing. . . .
"This may be a desirable rule of construction to apply
to a third-party beneficiary contract where the promisor's
interest in or connection with the third party, in contrast
with the promisee's, begins with the promise and ends with
its performance. . . .
"This collective bargaining agreement, however, is not a
typical third-party beneficiary contract. The promisor's
interest in the third party here goes far beyond the mere
performance of its promise to that third party, i.e., beyond
the payment of royalty. It is a commonplace of modern
industrial relations for employers to provide security for
employees and their families to enable them to meet prob-
lems arising from unemployment, illness, old age or
death. . . . In a very real sense Benedict's interest in the
soundness of the fund and its management is in no way less
than that of the promisee union. This of itself cautions
against reliance upon language which does not explicitly
provide that the parties contracted to protect Benedict by
allowing the company to set off its damages against its
royalty obligation."
In short, the collective labor agreement is something more than
the usual contract being, in effect, an agreement affected with a public
interest: "Finally a consideration which is not present in the case
of other third-party beneficiary contracts is the impact of the national
labor policy' . .. [which] becomes an important consideration in
determining whether the same inferences which might be drawn as to
other third-party agreements should be drawn here."'" The Court
concludes that in the absence of a clear provision in the agreement to
the contrary, the set-off against the third party beneficiary is not
permissible.
A similar case, Lewis v. Barnes Contracting Company,'" also
involved the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement and its
158 The Supreme Court of the United States here cites § 301(b) of the Taft-
Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1958), supra note 120.
159 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., supra note 155.
160 179 F.Supp. 673 (N.D. W.Va. 1959).
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enforcement. The trustees of the Fund contended that new strip mines
being worked by the defendant company were within the purview of
the Agreement, a contention denied by the Company as not being the
intention of the parties. The District Court for the Northern District
of West Virginia, citing the Court of Appeals decision in Lewis v.
Benedict Coal Corporation, held that "The Fund is, in effect, a third-
party beneficiary to the collective bargaining contract."' This con-
clusion was reached pursuant to West Virginia law this being a
diversity case.'"
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
While it is true that the application of the third party beneficiary
doctrine to collective labor agreements has been criticized,'" the
critics recognize that it has been adopted in a great majority of the
cases,'" of which Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation, 165 is the most
recent. Since the courts have given the doctrine such wide-spread
recognition, there seems to be no particularly sound reason why it
should not prevail in labor cases as in other contract situations. True,
there are jurisdictions which do not subscribe to the doctrine, but
these are in such a slim minority as to be well-nigh negligible. In
any event, Massachusetts, the leading opponent of the third party
beneficiary rule, enforces employee rights without cavil. However,
this 'criticism and the confusion that is apparent in some of the cases
is probably the result of attempts to fit the beneficiary under a col-
lective labor agreement into one of the two classic categories: creditor
or donee. It may well be time to admit that the employee does not
fit into either category and simply recognize him as a "labor bene-
ficiary."
Of the other theories supporting enforcement of employee rights,
the custom or usage theory which denies to the collective labor agree-
"I Id. at 674, citing Lewis v. Mearns, 168 F.Supp. 134 (ND. W.Va. 1958), aff'd,
268 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1958).
182 That West Virginia recognizes and applies the third party beneficiary principle
as applied to collective labor agreements, see West. v. B. & 0. RR. Co., supra note 20.
261 Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 49 Colum.
L. Rev. 829 (1948) ; Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57
Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1958); Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the
American Legal System, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1109 (1941); Rice, Collective Labor Agree-
ments in American Law, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 572 (1931); Warns, The Nature of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 3 Miami L.Q. 235 (1949); Witmer, Collective Labor
Agreements in the Courts, 48 Yale L.J. 195 (1938).
164 Jaeger, Cases and Statutes on Labor Law, 759, note 2, where are listed a
number of the articles dealing with this question. The Ability of an Individual Em-
ployee to Sue His Employer on a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 3 Buffalo L. Rev.
270 (1954); see supra preceding note. Cf. Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective
Bargaining Agreements, 8 Lab. L,J. 850 (1957).
166 Supra note 155.
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ment the status of a contract, appears to have been definitely laid to
rest by the virtually universal ,
 acceptance of these agreements as
contracts. Another theory,. not yet accepted, would accord to these
agreements the force and effect of a codel -66
 or organic law for a given
industry'67
 'and • as such govern .the terms of the individual employ-
ment contracts."' The -agency theory has been discarded largely
because if pressed to its • logical extremity,. it would make the union
member an agent and principal in the same transaction. This theory
is also unsatisfactory in that it leaves unanswered the question as to
the position of the employee who does not join the union until after
the agreement has .been .made.. Procedural difficulties preventing, suits
against the union by its „Members raise.firther problems. •
•In summary, then, it;Seems clear that if the right of the employee
to, enforce the collective labor agreement under the common Iaw may
have been doubtful in 'some jurisdictions, the federal statutes appear
to have removed that doubt.:In any event, the employee, regardless
of his membership in the union which negotiated • the collective labor
agreement, is entitled tO ,
 enforce rights ;
 embodied therein for his
benefit. According to the' Westinghouse :
 case, he is free, to put'sue
these rights, certainly 'as, against. the employer, in the state courts.
As against the union,, the latest •federal legislation ;
 The Lab6r-Manage-
inent Reporting and 'Disclosure -Act affords him access to the federal
courts..
The. conclusionS to be drawn therefore are
.1 1.. AT COMMON LAW, the-individual employee is a third party
beneficiary and should be 'described as'"a labor beneficiary."
2. To be a labor beneficiary, an employee need not, as a basis
for his action, be. a member of ,the union which entered into the
collective labor agreement.	 •
3. UNDER THE STATUTES, a collective labor agreement is a
contract affected with the public interest.
4. The collective labor agreement embraces rights .personal to
the employee and others, enforceable only by the union. ,
5. These rights are created by the negotiated agreement viewed
as a' contract, but augmented by statutory obligation.
1611 As, for example,. in France; cf. Ddguit, Collective Acts as Distinguished from
Contracfi, 27 Yale L.J. 753 (1918).
167
 NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940), where the
court said: "The trade agreeinent 'thus becomes . .. the industrial constitution of the
enterprise . • Cf. Yazoo & M.V. R.R. Co. v. Webb, supra note 18; see Chamberlain,
op. cit. supra note 163 and , 6 N.Y.U. Conference on Labor (1953) ;, cf. Sullivan, Book
Review, 12 J. Legal Ed. 464 (1960).
168 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, supra note 70.
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